

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**TURKEY'S CRUCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The first wave of modern political terrorism hit Turkey in 1925 and continued intermittently until 1971. The second stage of terrorism occurred between the years of 1975-1980. In 1979 – nearly at the end of the Cold War - the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) was founded. Turkey has been the main target of the PKK-related terrorism. Although the Turkish Armed Forces have succeeded in fighting terrorism and preserving the country, the PKK has survived by becoming a transnational terrorist group and seeking refuge in nations neighboring Turkey. To solve the issue of transnational terrorism, all nations should reach a consensus in this struggle and give a hand to each other. During the last three decades the Turkish Armed Forces have gained a great deal of experience. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, Turkey is and will remain an important partner for the U.S. The purpose of this paper is to look at the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership and to examine the Turkish experience in fight against terrorism and the common security interest of the two countries. It also examines the two nations' war against terrorism through strategic alliance.

## TURKEY'S CRUCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

At almost every platform where strategic assessments are made, it is frequently expressed by the strategists that the security environment has changed and, accordingly, there exists the necessity for changing basic security concepts and strategies. Despite this reality, the existence of the ongoing problems forces consideration of the unchanged elements as well. No matter how much the security environment and the security conditions have changed the fact remains that security is mainly a national responsibility. Although security is a national responsibility, it is becoming more important and necessary to carry out this responsibility within the framework of international cooperation. The tragic events of 9/11 have been condemned by all nations of the world and have proved the fact that even the most powerful countries can easily be targeted by terrorism. Especially at this point, assessing the relations between globalization and terrorism from a security perspective proves useful.

With the escalation of global terrorism, shifting from strategic planning constrained by national borders to a more global perspective is necessary. This means that irregular threats take priority over the conventional threat in this context. Today terrorist organizations have achieved the capability to show up and to launch terrorist attacks anywhere in the world at any time. This means that terrorism has become global; consequently, national security has gained a more international dimension. When viewed from this perspective, global peace and security is either everywhere or nowhere. The main problem that countries face in fighting terrorism today, however, is how to find the right path and the proper balance between security at the national, international, and individual levels. To protect democracy, it is essential to take the necessary protective measures in order to defend effectively against terrorism.

### Definition of Terrorism

According to some, those who fight against a state, its authority, and people are independence warriors or freedom fighters whereas the others deem them terrorists. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as "[t]he unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."<sup>1,2</sup> According to the U.S. Department of State, terrorism is defined as, "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."<sup>3,4</sup>

There has been a true threat from post-Cold Era terrorism against all countries. At the end of the 20th century and at the very beginning of 21st century, the world had experienced two major events. These events have deeply shaken international relations, alliances, strategic theories, and concepts like security, and forced strategists to change their approaches. The first of these events was the collapse of the Berlin Wall; the second was September 11, 2001. Both events revealed two different faces of globalization. First, any country may be the target of global terrorism. Second, irregular threats pre-empt conventional ones. This is especially the case since terrorists have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction from the old Soviet Union and former Iron Curtain countries for more than fifteen years.

#### The Terrorism Issue in Turkey

The first wave of modern political terrorism hit Turkey in 1925. Before the Turkish Republic was established, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, there were disturbances between the Alevi and Sunni Kurdish communities as they exist today. The Ottoman Empire solved this problem by using the Hamidiye Regiments from Sunni Kurdish communities to repress the Alevi rebellion. Also during the Turkish Independence War, Kurds helped the national troops to suppress the Armenian insurgency and Russian assaults. The Kurdish tribes, however, were so diverse that there were no common understandings among them. Their religions, languages, and habitations differed since Kurdish identity had yet evolved. Because the Ottoman Empire created an Ottoman culture in the Muslim citizens, one could not claim that he/she was either Turkish or Kurdish. During the War of Independence from 1919 to 1922, the Alevis fought against the national troops. David McDowall said in his book that:

They were hostile to the recovery of the Turkish state, because this suggested growing control of Dersim. . . West Dersim (Tunceli) had been excluded from the area formally designated at Sevres Treatment in August (1920) as a part of an autonomous Kurdish state.<sup>5</sup>

Turks and Kurds fought against internal and external enemies between 1919 and 1922. The internal enemies were some Alevi groups, Armenian terrorists, and the Sultan and the Caliph supporters. The external enemies were the British, the French, the Italians, the Russians, and the Greeks, all of whom invaded some part of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. After the foundation of the new republic the situation changed. Formerly, the Ottoman Capital was Istanbul and many of the Sultanate and Caliphate supporters were in Istanbul, and they opposed the new government. The Sultanate already had flown abroad in a British vessel after the Turkish victory. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first president of Turkey, naturally, felt

threatened concerning the new Turkish Republic. The Caliph justified his belief by acting and speaking in public as if he was ruling a government in Istanbul. The caliph supporters were also affecting public opinion and this was their objective according to their goals. If the new republic would return to the old monarchic system, then Turkey's destiny would have been the same as the Ottoman Empire's. Moreover, all of their efforts would be for naught. Upon the emergence of a threat toward the new republic, the Grand National Assembly abolished the caliphate and ordered all the members of the Ottoman Dynasty to leave Turkey. <sup>6</sup>

After Turkey stripped religious institutions and Islamic law from the governmental and justicial systems, some religiously-minded Kurds rose against the new Turkish State under the pretext of establishing an independent Sharia Kurdistan in 1925. Their intent was to found an independent Kurdish State in the southeastern Anatolia, and to be free of Ankara's rule.<sup>7</sup> The Turkish government had war time experience and well-established supply and communication networks; consequently, it deployed its troops more quickly than the Kurds did and suppressed the revolts. David McDowall interpreted this revolt: "It was the last time the caliphate was invoked to rally the Kurds, but by no means the end of Kurdish religious particularism."<sup>8</sup> After this revolt, Dersim Kurds carried out further attacks against the Turkish Armed Forces from 1935 to 1937, and the Turkish Armed Forces, government officials, and some citizens suffered from torture, executions, and mutilation at their hands. The Dersim leaders sent messengers to Elazig requesting self-determination.<sup>9</sup> The insurgency, however, was successfully suppressed by the Armed Forces and this brought an end to the tribal Kurdish revolts against the Turkish Republic in that era.

During the Cold War period, Turkey experienced modern political terrorism which occurred in two stages during the 1960s and again from 1975 to 1980. The first stage of terrorism occurred in the late 1960s when Marxist students tried to overturn the Turkish Republic. The robberies and murders lasted for three years and finally subsided in 1971 after military intervention. The second stage of terrorism occurred between the years of 1975-1980. Radical groups responsible for terrorism included leftist and rightist movements as well as ethnic and religious extremists. Various political groups, particularly the left wing factions, used violence in the hope that civil disorder and the consequent suppression by the state might lead to revolution. The leftist movement turned increasingly to violence and terrorism. The most active of the left-wing terrorist groups were DEV-GENC (Revolutionary Young), DEV-SOL (Revolutionary Left), and DEV-YOL (Revolutionary Path). In 1980, the toll of the political killing increased to more than twenty per day. Ultimately, Turkish Armed Forces ended the terrorism through military intervention: Turkish Armed Forces toppled the government and seized the rule

in a bloodless coup on September 12, 1980. In addition to these terror waves, Turkey struggled with international Armenian terrorism. Armenian terrorists infiltrated Turkish agencies and organizations outside Turkey. The best-known of these groups, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation (ASALA), apparently was formed in 1975 among leftist Armenians living in Beirut, Lebanon. The ASALA assassinated twenty-five Turkish diplomats between 1975 and 1984.

Nearly at the end of the Cold War Era, the Partiya Karkari Kurdistan-The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was founded in 1979. During the military regime the PKK militants escaped from Turkey to Lebanon via Syria and set up their bases at camps in the Bekaa Valley. Following Turkey's 1983 elections, in which a civilian government had come to power a different kind of terrorism began. On August 15, 1984, some Kurdish separatists started ambushing the Turkish troops in the southeastern part of the country; subsequently, Turkish authorities found themselves fighting a new Marxist form of terrorism. The PKK launched a series of attacks and ambushes on Turkish Forces in southeastern Turkey. For twenty-two years, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) had been fighting with these terrorists.

In the 1990s, Turkey also faced religious extremist terrorism. Radical Islamic activism - sometimes described as fundamentalism- has also been a source of terrorism. The journalists, politicians, and academics who were outspoken defenders of Turkish secularism were the particular targets of these terrorists. Several Islamic groups claimed responsibility for these deaths, among them, the Islamic Movement Organization, about which little is known, and Hezbollah, composed of local Islamists linked to the Iranian government, which had targeted external enemies of Iran. Turkish Secret Service and Security Forces (Police) terminated these fundamentalist groups' activities in 1998.

#### Turkey's Response against Terrorism

Ethnic terrorism and its alignment with the religious radical fundamentalists has been the greatest challenge for Turkey since 1925. The ethnic terrorist groups sometimes exploited religion or claimed Marxist ideology, like PKK. Gunduz Aktan explained the PKK strategy related to the independence Kurdistan in Alexander Yonah's book. According to the PKK's party program Kurdistan, where the PKK hopes to set up an independent state in the future, was divided by four "colonizers" -Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Their aim was to establish a united Kurdish state. According to the PKK, the largest part of Kurdistan, however, was in Turkey.<sup>10</sup>

At the highest level, the PKK was organized as follows: the party the Front – ERNK (National Liberation Front of Kurdistan) and the Army ARGK (People's Liberation Army of

Kurdistan). The party was organized as follows: Congress, Secretary General, General Committee, and Central Executive Board.

The PKK's strategy was explained in the Turkish War College's edition: PKK's probable aim was to divide Turkish unity. According to Col Ismet Kurtulan, this strategy focused on two subjects: Guerilla War and diplomatic efforts in the international area. Actually, the PKK achieved some diplomatic successes in the West European countries by carrying out political assassinations and guerilla war in Turkey. This strategy consists of four stages: Cultural autonomy, Local autonomy, Federation, and Independence Kurdistan.<sup>11</sup> It seems that these stages are PKK's general strategies. To achieve its respective goals, the PKK executed a military strategy mentioned in McDowall's book. David McDowall stated this PKK's strategy. At the PKK's second congress in 1982, it formulated this strategy in three broad phases in a time period: defense, balance, and offense.<sup>12</sup> Through this strategy, the PKK started guerilla activity aiming to drive Turkish Armed Forces and all Turkish officials from the region. To be successful in this strategy the PKK employed some tactics. The PKK might employ coercion, provocation, intimidation, or support for insurgency according to Gunduz Aktan and Ali Koknar.<sup>13</sup>

The PKK terrorist organization employed the following tactics in the execution of its defense strategy: 1. The PKK created terror against the Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnic origin in the southeastern Turkey targeting children, women, and the elderly. The aim was to force the local population into submission and to make them provide sanctuary. 2. It created terror against the non-Kurdish population to discredit the state institutions and cause instability. 3. It assassinated selected targets like state functionaries, security personnel, and government officials. 4. It assassinated informants and repentant militants. In this way, the PKK has conducted kidnappings and acts of arson in Western Europe against former PKK members and defectors. 5. It carried out wider hit and run tactics against border posts and military patrols. 6. It attacked industrial infrastructure, oil facilities, social facilities, and tourist sites with the aim of weakening the Turkish economy and tarnishing its image. 7. It ordered the use of suicide bombings against Turkish targets that resulted in the deaths of security personnel and civilians, and injuries to many more. If it had been successful in this strategy, the PKK would have executed its balance and offense strategies. Today, it still has been carrying out its defense strategy. Because of the Turkish Armed Forces' overwhelming conventional strength and guerilla war experience, the PKK has avoided direct confrontation with the security forces.

The PKK was identified as one of the main terrorist organizations in the world by the U.S. Department of State on December 31, 2001.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, the PKK's terrorist activities have resulted, to date, in the death of thousands of people, including women, the elderly, and



children. The PKK also murdered over one hundred school teachers between 1984 and 1998, who became inevitable targets of the terrorists since it was judged that the PKK's subversive views could be most easily imposed on the uneducated and the ignorant.<sup>15</sup>

In the face of its military defeat by the Turkish Armed Forces, the PKK changed its strategy from pursuit of independence to recognition of the Kurdish identity and autonomy after Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK's leader, was captured by Turkish Special Forces in Kenya in 1999, and Syria ordered the PKK to leave Syria and Lebanon. If Turkey had been unsuccessful in challenging the Kurdish terrorists, it might have affected not only Middle East policies, but all world policies. In his comments Olson argued that weak states that are driven by internal threats will not affect the global balance of power. Olson also claims that Turkey and Iran are not weak states. Their inability to contain the Kurdish terrorists might affect greatly not only the Middle Eastern policies, but also all the world policies and regional balance of power.<sup>16</sup>

Both the internal and external threats of PKK are also rooted in Northern Iraq. In addition to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Ma'sud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani, the PKK settled in the north of Iraq. The PKK forces that annoyed Turkey found sanctuary in the region. Robert Olson commented on the situation related to the Northern Iraq:

The safe haven established for the Kurds by the Allied forces after the 1991 Gulf War is a good example of anarchy, as defined in international relations theory, reproduced in the third world states reminiscent of that produced by international politics.<sup>17</sup>

During the 1<sup>st</sup> Gulf War, 500,000 Kurdish refugees from Iraq were accepted into Turkey. The Turkish Government accommodated them in Turkey, protected them from the Saddam Hussein Regime, and gave them humanitarian support. During their transit, effective border control was lost and many of the PKK terrorists consequently infiltrated Turkey by hiding among the refugees. After the Gulf War, many Iraqi Army heavy weapons and munitions arsenals were looted. The PKK then obtained both weapons and munitions through the black market and a great deal of revenue from human and drug smuggling. These PKK terrorists collaborated with the Kurdish terrorists already in Turkey and smuggled ammunition, weapons, and explosives into Turkey, stolen from the Iraqi Army. Particularly in 1993 and 1994, the PKK carried out many terrorist activities and massacres as a result. Among the other sources of the PKK's revenue are human and drug smuggling. The 1992 annual report of the U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, entitled, "The International Narcotics Control Strategy" (INCS), proposed that the European drug cartel was controlled by PKK members.

Likewise, the 1996 INCS report underlined the fact that the PKK terrorists used heroin production and trafficking to support PKK's operations throughout Turkey.<sup>18</sup>

The PKK also operated from bases and camps in Northern Iraq. An authority gap, resulting from the implementation of UN coercive measures in Iraq, gave the PKK an opportunity to operate bases in Northern Iraq which allowed them to attack into Turkey. After the Iraq War in 2003, PKK terrorism emerged again in Turkey. The potential of the PKK alignment with the PUK gave the PKK a chance to survive in Northern Iraq. After the Gulf War, a Kurdish State was practically founded in Northern Iraq with a parliament, government, and an army, which were steps toward an independent Kurdistan.

The PKK also received external support. Syria, Iran, and Armenia allowed the PKK to escape back across their borders after raids into Turkey. Syria and Greece were the principal countries that had been supporting the PKK for years. Greece, a NATO ally, backed the PKK and its affiliates by every means at its disposal. The statement made by former Greek Premier Simitis on November 26, 1998, leaves no room for doubt about the position of Greece vis-à-vis the PKK: "The PKK is an organization fighting for the rights of the Kurdish minority and using various means to reach this end."<sup>19</sup> Hundreds of the PKK militants arrested in Turkey confessed that Greek support for the PKK terrorism far exceeded what was generally estimated. Fethi Demir and Semdin Sakik, the PKK's second man captured in northern Iraq, helped to confirm concretely the continuing Greek support for the PKK.<sup>20</sup> A brief overview of Greek-Turkish and Cyprus problems will easily explain why the Greek and South Cyprus Greek administration supported PKK activities.<sup>21</sup> In all of these matters, the reason for opposing Turkey is the same: The enemy of my enemy is my friend. However, with the signing of the Adana memorandum on October 20, 1998, the Syrian connection had been broken. Syrian authorities promised not to support terrorist activities against Turkey in the Adana Agreement.

#### Strategic Response of Turkey

Although the PKK Terrorist Organization had often been brutal, Turkey had always continued to fight against them by obeying the rules of the law. If Turkey had not respected their human rights, these issues would not exist today. Turkish policy regarding PKK terrorism was to defeat the terrorists, terminate terrorists' sources of funding and support, help make Turkey a safer country, prevent the terrorists from misuse of facilitative conditions for their human and drug smuggling and, finally, create a peaceful and secure environment for all Turkish citizens.

Turkey adopted some strategies to fight against terrorism, especially the PKK. The most important strategy was the field domination. As to this strategy, particular troops would be

responsible for security in defined areas. Consequently, Turkey employed the village guard militia (Geçici Köy Korucusu) who were charged to protect their villages against terrorists, and armed by the government, to operate with joint proxy forces (KDP and KUP),<sup>22</sup> prepared the army according to special warfare methods, made alliances, shared experiences to gain intelligence capability and exchanged intelligence information (especially with Israel and the U.S.) to deter the terrorist-sponsoring states of Iran, Syria, and Greece.<sup>23</sup>

To achieve these strategies the Turkish Government upheld the following three principles in its armed intervention against the PKK in the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey:

1. Armed intervention whenever it happens will be within the understanding of a state ruled by law and democracy.
2. Utmost attention will be paid to armed conflict with the PKK in order to prevent the people of the region from being harmed.
3. Fighting against this PKK organization will be based on the concept of legitimate self-defense.

The main difficulty with coping with this threat was distinguishing between the PKK and innocent people; consequently, throughout the struggle against the PKK, security forces were very careful in order not to kill innocent citizens. The terrorists' locations were identified, observed, and terminated. When their supporters were detected, they too, were neutralized and paralyzed. These were all military activities conducted by the Turkish military.

In turn, the government took economic and social precautions that supported the citizens' livelihood by making investments to speed up the development of the region. Simultaneously, it offered incentives to the private sector to make investments. Furthermore, the government also invested economically in the region, creating more work areas and supporting the families who wanted to return to their villages. However, the PKK, knowing its own existence depends upon keeping the region undeveloped, sabotaged much of the work undertaken in the region, burned down construction sites, and damaged oil wells. Turkey used her Armed Forces to eliminate these terrorist activities. The security forces destroyed all the terrorists who conducted assassinations in the rural and urban areas.

#### Risk Assessment

Turkey has struggled with terrorism and coped with the PKK terrorists for more than twenty years. However, the sources of terrorism still exist. Although the inner sources were destroyed, the outside quagmires could not be drained. Even though the ringleader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured and imprisoned in the Imrali Island in 1999, and Syria and Iran

ended their PKK sponsorship, the PKK has continued to survive in Northern Iraq. In three years, the PKK collapsed and its members splintered. This situation resulted from a crisis with Syria. Turkey had persuaded Syria to drive away Öcalan and his supporters from abroad and forced her to stop sponsoring the PKK. The number of the terrorists decreased on a large scale between 1999 and 2003.<sup>24</sup>

As of 1999, the PKK faltered and was indecisive about its strategy. The other terrorist ringleaders, like Murat Karayilan, the ERNK leader, and Osman Ocalan, Abdullah Ocalan's brother, could not agree on a new strategy. Karayilan argued that the PKK had to continue terror activities. On the contrary, Osman Ocalan claimed that the PKK had to give up conflict and start to employ political methods. So the terrorists were separated into two groups. Abdullah Ocalan supported Karayilan with his directives to military activities from the prison. Since most of the terrorists took sides with Karayilan, Osman Ocalan escaped from Northern Iraq. The PKK wanted the Turkish government to give amnesty to all the terrorists in return for giving up their arms, and proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire, while continuing its murders in Turkey. The number of terrorists, however, decreased on a large scale in Turkey between 1999 and 2003, because some terrorists surrendered to the security forces.

After the Iraq War, however, the situation changed. Some terrorists infiltrated other Kurdish groups like the PUK and the PDK and, during the war, they survived in Northern Iraq. Upon the fall of the Saddam regime, they assembled on Mount Kandil. In the buffer zone, formed in Northern Iraq, terrorist camps were organized by the PKK, especially on Mount Kandil. The PKK benefited from the region by using it as shelter/asylum or safe haven.

While the PKK terrorists generally settled in Northern Iraq, the experienced militants stayed in Turkey. As of June 2004, the PKK started conflicts with suicide attacks, live bombings, road/railroad minings, and ambushing military troops. One reason for the change in PKK's strategy was the Turkey-EU membership negotiations which the PKK hoped would lead to an amnesty for the PKK terrorists. In the year 2006, the level of the PKK's terrorist activities is as same as the level in 1999.

The PKK emerged as a third power in the region. Meanwhile, the number of terrorists having sneaked into Turkey had increased in two years. There were approximately 5,000 terrorists on Mount Kandil. Terrorists consistently trained in these camps, formed groups, crossed the borders, deployed the groups into the mountains, or hid in the cities and laid traps for our citizens. Actually, they not only killed Turkish people but they also wanted to terrorize all people who came to our country. Whenever the government made efforts to improve the

situation in Turkey, the terrorists continued to survive by moving into Iraq. In and out of Turkey, the number of terrorists remarkably increased in the last one year.<sup>25</sup>

According to Robert Olson, Turkish policy toward the PKK faced a maelstrom after the PKK existence in northern Iraq.<sup>26</sup> They had been using explosives in larger cities like Istanbul, Mersin, and Adana. The PKK hoped that Turkey would have to declare a general amnesty for the PKK terrorists during the EU membership negotiations. Therefore, the PKK aimed to call the EU's attention. David McDowall assessed the situation in Turkey: "The apparent end of PKK armed action gave hope that such a long expected development would be averted. Yet the danger remained that this nightmare might still emerge. Many towns and cities on the south coast and in the Hatay faced a major influx of migrants."<sup>27</sup> The strategy that Turkey implemented worked up until 2003. Today, the problem is stemming from Northern Iraq. There are some methods to cope with the terrorism issue. Each country has a different environment; therefore, each country has different solutions to its problems.

Turkish Security Forces have gained great success as a result of their precise, dedicated, and determined operations against the PKK terrorist organization within democratic and legal rules. Consequently, Turkey has reduced PKK terrorism to a level which can be controlled. Of course, now it is time to do something to provide a suitable environment to develop the economic situation as well as to fight effectively against the other dimensions of PKK terrorism, such as political and financial support from abroad, in order to eliminate the terror in our country completely. It is time to end the PKK's existence in Northern Iraq. Therefore, Turkey needs the countries which provide any form of support to the PKK to cease that support.

#### Turkey- U.S. Strategic Partnership and Security Interests

Turkey and the U.S. are two NATO allies which share a sound and deep-rooted partnership. During the Cold War period, Turkey served as NATO's southern flank and caused the Soviets to redirect some of their forces away from the Central European front. The NATO membership also prevented the Soviets from acquiring the Turkish Straits and gaining free access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea and giving Kars and Ardahan provinces in the Soviets favor. At the same time, Turkey-U.S. cooperation in defense industry and military training and education has developed after World War II.

When compared to those in Cold War era, today countries are faced with a completely different set of challenges, which require new approaches to security. Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), religious extremism, illicit trafficking of humans, drugs and

arms, poverty, immigration, and disasters have emerged as new threats to Turkey and require new thinking in this era. Terrorism is a common denominator for all of these issues.

In this period, some argued that Turkey's role as a security partner for NATO and the U.S. had been unimportant. The reason for this claim was that Turkey did not permit U.S. troops to attack Iraq through Turkish territory in 2003; the U.S. achieved its goals without Turkey's support. As of 2003, the U.S.-Turkey relationship had grown cold, and the negative developments had come from insufficient communications so far.

The two countries, in spite of occasional ups and downs, are enjoying a well established friendship today. The Turkish and the American relations are based on a strategic partnership. The dimension of strategic partnership is determined by the variety of the common interests of both nations. First of all, there may be differences between allied nations. What is important is that the differences should be at a reasonable and manageable level alongside many common points. Therefore, Turkey and the U.S. should determine the basic points where their interests coincide, and expand areas of common interest. The common points where Turkish and American interests have coincided so far in the face of various regional problems and developments are the following:

**Terrorism:** The War on Terrorism is an international effort that will require international cooperation if victory is to be achieved. Most of the terrorist organizations have worldwide communication networks and they benefit from technology. Their money supplies and supporters are not in a particular country, so it is difficult to determine who and where the targets are. All countries should cooperate to overcome terrorism. Reaching a consensus on the concept and methodology is more important than ever. When the details of the bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S. are examined, it is clearly seen that the Turkish and the American national interests coincide in various fields. Therefore, mutual expectations are shaped within the framework of this reality. Friendship and partnership have survived through hard times and improved on strong foundations through mutual understanding and interests to reach today's level.

**NATO:** Turkey attaches great importance to NATO and considers it currently the most valid and the strongest organization of collective defense and security. Turkey opposes all possible developments that would harm NATO's effectiveness. NATO is an organization strengthened and supported by the U.S. Within the framework of international efforts to promote peace and stability in the region, Turkey has contributed to almost all of NATO initiatives actively from the beginning and continues to do so. Within the framework of PFP (Partnership

for Peace) program, Turkey continues to contribute to peace and stability in spite of our scarce resources and tries to share its experience with Balkan, Eurasian, and Central Asian republics.

Israel: Turkey is eager to develop better relations with all the nations of the region, particularly with Israel and with other pro-western countries for regional stability. Turkish-Israeli cooperation consolidates Israel's position in the region. Turkish cooperation with Israel could be a catalyst for establishing a lasting peace in the Middle East. Turkey has supported the Middle East Peace Process between Arab countries and Israel for a peaceful regional stability. An enduring peace in the Middle East serves the U.S. interests as well as the regional countries. Turkey also convinced Syria to withdraw her troops from Lebanon in 2005.

Jordan: Jordan plays a critical role in the Middle East peace process. The U.S. and Turkey both support the Jordanian commitment to peace and stability in the region. Jordan's participation in the Turkish-Israeli dialogue is most welcome and encouraging. Turkey and Jordan have increased their defense ties and Turkey has helped to strengthen the Jordanian defense industry.

Iraq: As for Iraq, Turkey's foreign policy about this country is clear enough. Turkey supports an Iraq with territorial and political integrity. An American failure or untimely exit from Iraq before the new political order is fully settled will cause chaos. Such a development would not serve Turkey's national interests. Turkey has provided important support for the U.S. in Iraqi operations. General Ilker BASBUG, Deputy Chief of Turkish General Staff, expressed Turkey's contributions in his remarks on 06 June 2005:

Turkey opened her airfields to the U.S. Approximately, 5000 sorties were conducted and 39 aircraft were allowed to make emergency landings on Diyarbakir, Batman, and Incirlik bases in Turkey and all their needs were met. Tanker aircraft stationed at 10th Tanker Base Command/Incirlik have executed 2200 sorties for air refueling since August 2003. On 28 April 2005 Turkey gave a positive response to the U.S. request to use the 10th Tanker Base Command/Incirlik as a logistic hub center and on 01 June 2005 these activities began.<sup>28</sup>

With this, Turkey provided a new facility of logistic support for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Afghanistan: Turkey wants to see a truly united, peaceful, and democratic Iraq and Afghanistan as soon as possible. Within this context, Turkey has contributed to the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) Operations in Afghanistan from the very beginning. Assuming the command of ISAF-II, Turkey has become one of the major countries that supports the U.S. in Afghanistan, where she first started the struggle against global terrorism after 9/11.

Turkey has assumed the command of ISAF-VII since February 2005 and the responsibility to run Kabul Airport. Within this context, headquarters of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps was deployed to Afghanistan. Turkey's personnel strength in Afghanistan is around 1600. In addition, she has been providing important logistical and training support in Afghanistan. This force will help maintain stability in the region and help control drug trafficking originating from this country that is linked to international terrorism. Afghans who have suffered for years will have a more democratic government, and have the chance to heal their society.

Iran: As for Iran, it has a theocratic regime. No doubt, every nation is free to make its own choice of government. In the past, Iran was suspected of efforts to destabilize neighboring regimes including Turkey's. Its nuclear program is beyond its legitimate energy requirements. Like other countries, especially the U.S., Turkey has been following Iran's nuclear efforts with serious concern and cannot welcome an Iran which possesses nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Turkey's policy is to see the Middle East as a region clear of nuclear weapons. Turkey's general policy related to this issue is that it should be solved through diplomacy. The increase in the number of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their proliferation in the Middle East poses an important security risk to Turkey.

Syria: Turkey-Syria relations had remained tense based on threat perceptions due to Syria's support of the PKK terrorist organization and its hosting the head of the terrorist organization for years, but entered into a period of improvement with the Adana Agreement Document signed in 1998.

Balkans: It is clear that the U.S. played the major role in starting the Bosnia-Herzegovina operation.

Turkey's request to participate in the UN Peace Force known as UNPROFOR, with the purpose of facilitating and protecting secure regions for the humanitarian aid operation in Bosnia, was approved by the UN Security Council on March 22nd, 1994. Turkey participated in UNPROFOR with a mechanized regiment of 1,400 troops between August 4th, 1994 and December 31st, 1995.<sup>29</sup>

Turkey today is represented in all headquarters in Balkans. Turkey has participated in NATO-led KFOR operation and in EU-led ALTHEA operation with the strength of one battalion. In addition, Turkey has also offered to NATO a reserve battalion to be used in the Balkans.

The Black Sea and Caucasus: The long term security and the stability of the Black Sea and Caucasian region very much depend on U.S.-Turkey cooperation. Turkey is essential for solid regional security. It should be noted that Turkey's success in the Caucasus is built on her being a country that positively contributes to the regional dynamics and supports an integrated, secure, and prosperous Caucasus. Turkey is involved in a strong partnership with the U.S. in



the South Caucasus. The establishment of the U.S.-Turkey Caucasus Working Group is a promising development for contributing to peace and stability in the Caucasus region.

In the East, Turkey attaches great importance to the national unity and territorial integrity of its neighbors. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia have benefited from the joint U.S.-Turkey approach to the South Caucasus; however, the South Osetia and Abkhazia issues, in Georgia, still remain a source of problems. Bringing peace to this region will set an example for other regions. Turkey ran many military joint projects with the U.S. in Georgia. This cooperation is important also for the security of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline where the first oil was pumped through in late May 2005. This project was led and supported by the U.S. and was activated in autumn 2005 and created greater cooperation as well as opportunities in political, economic, and security fields.

Given the potential developments of terrorism that would shake the global balance and stability, Turkey's importance in war against terrorism is clear. When the preventive measures against terrorism and drug and human trafficking were increased in the Mediterranean and Anatolia, these illegal activities tended to be conducted through the Black Sea. Therefore, Turkey initiated a naval operation called BLACK SEA HARMONY in the Black Sea, complementing to OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR in the Mediterranean. The aim of the two operations is to execute rescue operations and prevent drug and human smuggling. In a region covering 40 percent of the Black Sea, suspect ships are monitored, and information about their navigation is shared with NATO countries and other littoral countries. Ships identified as suspicious are checked and questioned in Turkish harbors. This Turkish operation may continue in the future cooperatively with other littoral states of the Black Sea. In addition to this operation, some other military initiatives in the Black Sea were started. Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) that is occasionally comprised of littoral countries' naval forces is one of these initiatives.<sup>30</sup>

Russian Federation (R.F.): Turkey's pragmatic and constructive partnership with the Russian Federation is helpful for regional stability. For example, Turkey's security cooperation with the countries of the region including the Russian Federation will help this country to enhance her relations with NATO and stay in Euro-Atlantic Security System. BLACKSEAFOR is a good example of cooperation between the Russian Federation and a NATO country.

Today; new risks and asymmetric threats create new conflicts and add new dimensions to the security policies. In terms of her geo-strategic location, Turkey is at the epicenter of world's most unstable regions, namely the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Balkans. This geo-strategic location with its rich natural resources and ethnic compositions is the main source of

instabilities. Peace in the region could be achieved by preserving the territorial integrity of all states which are supposed to have democratic governments. This largely depends on the self-sufficiency of these countries in terms of economy as well as security. Turkey is a model for these countries and therefore, does her best to improve her cooperation with these countries. At the same time, in point of security and regional stability, the U.S. and Turkey share the same concerns. While enjoying the protective umbrella of the alliance, Turkey has made substantial contribution to NATO's collective security during Cold War period.

While the majority of NATO member states, today, enjoy an almost threat-free environment, the threats and risks to the security of Turkey in the post-Cold war period are significant due to her geopolitical and geo-strategic position in the world. Turkey still has some anti-democratic neighbors with whom it is impossible to solve bilateral problems by consultations. On the other hand, there is always a possibility of spill over of the regional conflicts to Turkey as a NATO territory. As a result of the last decade's developments, Turkey is no longer a "flank country" of NATO as in the Cold War period but has become a "front line country." That's why for Turkey, it is necessary to have a deterrent force as a tool of its foreign policy.

The security concerns of Turkey mainly emanate from the proliferation of WMD, and the spread of terrorism and religious fundamentalism. The unprecedented and large-scale terrorist attacks in several countries demonstrated to the world the magnitude of devastation that terrorism can cause. It is not a kind of problem that only one state or organization could solve individually. With regard to all peace and security providing initiatives, this region will need more stability as the intersection area of the interests of alliances and countries. Turkey always has been an indispensable and integral part of the European security. Not only Europe but also the U.S. needs Turkey whose policy is aimed at integration with EU. The U.S., in this process, will have strong interests.

Turkey and United States of America are two NATO allies, which share a sound and deep-rooted partnership. Today, the focal point of the U.S.-Turkey relationship comes on the Middle East Peace Process, Broader Middle East and North Africa Project, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans, whereas it was the Soviets in the Cold War period. Recently, Turkey has provided important support by opening her airfields for the U.S. operations in Iraq. The negative developments so far, which might have come from insufficient communications, are being overcome and relations are improving based on common interests.

## Conclusion / Recommendations

In conclusion, firstly, all countries must join in the war against terrorism. Fighting against terrorism is not a policy option; it is a necessity for survival of our democratic societies and our freedoms.<sup>31</sup> If those recognized as terrorists in a country for any reason are defined and identified in a different way by others, then this struggle has no chance to succeed. There should be no tolerance of any terrorist organization, even those which claim they are fighting an independence war. Any individual or group using terror as a method is called a terrorist. If a full consensus is not achieved on this understanding, it is impossible to cut the foreign support that feeds the terrorism and deal with this struggle.

With the escalation of global terrorism, it is necessary to shift from local strategic planning based on geographic borders to a more global approach. This means that irregular threats should take priority over conventional threats. Today terrorist organizations have achieved the capability to launch attacks anywhere in the world at anytime. This means that terrorism has become global. The main problem that countries face in fighting terrorism today is how to balance the three dimensions of security at the national, international, and individual levels.

A necessary effective battle against terrorism requires a shift in the domestic and international policies that enable terrorism to grow and the intensification of those efforts that can uproot it.<sup>32</sup> This requires reassessing the legal arrangements so that we can separate terror and other crimes. Terror penalties should be defined clearly by the laws. Internationally, Turkey must pursue alliances with the countries waging war against terrorism like the U.S., U.K., and Israel.

Turkey, today, needs more active and closer international cooperation in dealing with terrorism. Cooperation on combating terrorism requires a reliable consultation and decision making mechanism, a widespread intelligence network, proven planning systems, experience, and headquarters with settled procedures plus trained personnel. Especially allies should act together in this struggle. This definition points out NATO. In this context, NATO is the organization that will make the biggest contribution to the fight against terrorism.

The U.S. and Turkey should stand together in face of many international issues like the fight against terrorism, the illicit trafficking of drugs and arms, poverty, and religious extremism. The U.S. might also cooperate with Turkish security initiatives on the Black Sea. Turkish Special Forces also can share experience in counter terrorism operations in the region.

All leading democracies must impose sanctions on suppliers of weapon to the terrorists and terrorist supporting states. They should also impose sanctions on suppliers of nuclear technology to terrorist states.<sup>33</sup> The nuclear states axis starting from North Korea, passing

through the Middle East poses sensitivity on part of Turkey. The Middle East must be a nuclear weapon free zone. Turkey shares the U.S. concerns related to nuclear threat, and supports her policy. Turkey might convince Iran to give up developing WMD.

Turkey is in favor of increased confidence and stability in our region, and strengthening of democratic institutions. A modern, secular and able Turkey will continue to make significant contributions to regional and global security and stability through its partnership in Alliances and international institutions.

Turkey's membership in the EU will add momentum to its contributions. In such an environment, new potential cooperation areas will emerge between Turkey and the USA. While the U.S. is convincing the EU countries to cut the flow of funds from Europe to the PKK, Turkey may prevent human and drug trafficking via Turkey and fight against terrorism.

The existence of PKK in Northern Iraq is a great concern of Turkey. This region has become a shelter for this terrorist organization. This terrorist organization that so often changes its name is included in the U.S. and EU terrorist lists. However, only putting it in the list practically means nothing. What is meaningful and important is to take concrete actions against the terrorist organization. Turkey discusses this issue in trilateral negotiations with the U.S. and Iraqi government. Nevertheless, the fact that no action has been taken against the PKK so far is something to think about. Foreign support to the terrorist organization must absolutely be cut off and its hope of success must be dampened. Turkey expects more support from the U.S. regarding this issue just as the U.S. expects support from Turkey. The U.S., Turkey and Iraq might share information and prevent the PKK from surviving in the region for the regional stability.

If the bilateral necessary precautions are not taken afore mentioned, two countries will miss opportunity in fight against terrorism in an ambiguous future.

#### Endnotes

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